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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented a response to CEPR’s latest 
paper, which looked at the macroeconomic policies of 41 countries that currently 
have agreements with the Fund. Our paper had found that 31 of the 41 countries 
had implemented pro-cyclical policies, that is, either fiscal or monetary policies that 
would be expected to exacerbate an economic downturn, when such downturns 
were occurring in these countries. 
 
The IMF response was presented by James Roaf (Deputy Division Chief, Emerging 
Markets, Strategy, Policy and Review Department), in a PowerPoint presentation 
and panel discussion on October 15, 2009.
1 Most of the arguments, as well as 
graphs and charts, can also be found on the IMF web site,




The IMF’s first argument is that its policies have been “countercyclical, not 
procyclical!” as expressed in the PowerPoint presentation. The IMF’s presentation 
backs this up by looking at 15 emerging market countries and stating that program 
countries “Expanded fiscal deficits in 14 of 15” cases.
4 Similarly, the IMF’s review 
of crisis policies in low-income countries finds that “Close to two-thirds of the 
programs designed in 2007-09 increased the level of spending over time.”
5 
 
How can this be reconciled with CEPR’s finding that 31 of 41 countries with 
current policies have implemented counter-cyclical policies? After all, we are all 
using the same data, which comes from IMF documents and databases.  
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There are two main reasons for the competing claims. First, the IMF is ignoring its agreements that 
were signed in 2008, when the world economy was sliding into recession. This is when most of the 
31 agreements with pro-cyclical policies were signed. As we acknowledged in our paper, in many 
cases the pro-cyclical policies, such as reducing the fiscal deficit, were later loosened. However, since 
there are up to four to six months, and sometimes longer, before such agreements are reviewed, the 
decision to tighten fiscal and/or monetary policy during the downturn can still be expected to cause 
damage. 
 
Second, the IMF’s response to CEPR’s paper, as well as its own papers, did not deal with monetary 
policy, but instead was limited to fiscal policy. Although 14 of the 31 countries where pro-cyclical 
policies were found had both pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies, there were seven countries 
that only had pro-cyclical monetary policy. In many cases, tightening monetary policy during an 
economic downturn can be at least as damaging as tightening fiscal policy. 
 
This decision to tighten fiscal and monetary policy during an economic downturn in 31 countries 
represents a significant policy mistake, and a continuation of a long-term policy bias toward overly-
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, for which the IMF has been subject to criticism – some 
coming from its own Independent Evaluation Office
6 - over many years. The Fund should therefore 
acknowledge these mistakes, rather than trying to paper them over, and take measures to make sure 
that they do not happen again. 
 
This is especially important in light of the uncertainties surrounding the recovery of the world 
economy next year. As the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook notes,
7 there are many downside 
risks with regard to the expected recovery of the world economy next year. This is especially true of 
the US economy, which accounts for about one quarter of world GDP. The fiscal stimulus that has 
been allocated for 2009, for example, is a small fraction – perhaps about one-tenth – of the falloff in 
private demand that could be expected from the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble.
8 It is not yet 
clear whether the Congress will provide additional fiscal stimulus. 
 
Given the acknowledged downside risks to the recovery, it is important in the IMF’s reviews of 
current agreements, as well as new ones, that it err on the side of caution. As the Federal Reserve of 
the United States has pledged to do, it should be careful not to hobble the recovery by premature 
tightening of monetary policy, or fiscal policy as well. 
 
                                                 
6 IEO 2003a.  
7 IMF 2009c.  
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likely to need to fall significantly before reaching a sustainable level  (see Baker 2009).  Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 2009 • 3 
When is Fiscal Policy Counter-cyclical or Pro-cyclical? 
 
Another important issue that came up in this discussion is the definition of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
In our paper on the IMF’s current agreements, we adopted a criterion that was overly conservative – 
that is, it did not count as pro-cyclical some fiscal policy stances that would be widely seen as such, 
for example in the United States. 
 
In our paper, we only counted as pro-cyclical fiscal policy cases where the fiscal deficit was 
programmed to narrow (or surplus to increase), while the economy was in a downturn. This was 
done for the sake of argument, and also because we did not have access to data that would allow a 
calculation of the structural fiscal balance (see below). When the IMF states that program countries 
“Expanded fiscal deficits in 14 of 15” cases, and cites this as evidence of “Countercyclical, not 
Procyclical!” policy,
9 it is limiting the definition of pro-cyclical to those cases where the fiscal deficit 
narrows during a downturn. 
 
However, this definition is too narrow. Suppose, for example, that the economy is at full 
employment and is running a balanced budget. Economists would call this a structural fiscal balance 
of zero. Then, as the economy slows or heads into recession, revenues fall. The budget is now in 
deficit, but the structural balance remains at zero. The government has not adopted any counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. 
 
Now suppose that there are automatic stabilizers on the spending side. For example, in the United 
States, spending on federal programs such as food stamps, unemployment insurance, and other aid 
will automatically increase as the economy heads into recession. The government could reduce these 
benefits in order to cut off some of the increase in spending that would otherwise happen 
automatically. Thus, it could tighten the eligibility requirements, or size or duration of benefits for 
the unemployed or poor.  
 
In this case, the budget deficit would still widen because of the lost revenues and possibly even 
increased spending. Yet this would hardly be considered counter-cyclical policy
10 – certainly not in 
the United States. In fact, there would be quite a political backlash in the U.S. if our government 
tried to cut social programs in this way during a recession (the U.S. government has done the 
opposite in the current recession, for example by extending unemployment benefits and covering 
part of unemployed workers’ health insurance).  
 
Thus, any widening of the fiscal deficit during a downturn or recession should not necessarily be 
counted as counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
                                                 
9IMF PowerPoint presentation, CEPR 2009. 
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In the IMF paper “Review of Recent Crisis Countries” last month, the Fund states:   
 
“Deficits were allowed to rise in response to falling revenues and, in cases where 
domestic and external financing was lacking, this was facilitated by channeling 
Fund resources directly to the budget. In many instances, however, 
underlying concerns about debt sustainability and weak structural fiscal 
positions required limiting the full play of automatic stabilizers.” (IMF 
2009c, 3, emphasis added). 
 
This is an acknowledgement that in “many” of the 15 countries reviewed in this paper, the full 
spending increases that would have automatically occurred during a downturn were not allowed. In 
other words, this is comparable to the U.S. government having cut food stamp eligibility or benefits, 
or done the same of other social programs, during the current recession – which would not be 
considered counter-cyclical policy here.  
 
The countries where this occurred are shown in Figure 16, page 25 of its Review. This list turns out 
to include eight of the 15 countries reviewed in the paper:  Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Mongolia and Pakistan. Thus, when the Fund says that there are 
“Expanded fiscal deficits in 14 of 15 cases,” it is ignoring that in eight of these cases, the 
governments actually tightened their fiscal stance, reducing the impact of automatic stabilizers. 
Therefore, by a more common economic definition these governments adopted a contractionary, 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy. It would be good if the Fund did this calculation for all of its borrowing 
countries. 
 
The IMF’s “Review of Recent Crisis Countries” also notes that only four of the 15 countries “are 
expected to expand spending in real terms in 2009.” Furthermore the IMF finds that “Program 
countries show larger real spending cuts than non-program countries.”
11 
 
The Fund should support counter-cyclical policies that actually increase government spending, 
during a downturn, beyond what would be provided by automatic stabilizers. That is how the United 
States and other high-income countries have responded to the current recession. If there is some 
reason that this is not possible in a particular country, the Fund should provide a clear explanation 
of why it is not possible, even with the help of loans from the IMF. This would include not only the 
countries mentioned above, but also seven countries that, as the IMF acknowledged in its 
PowerPoint presentation last week, have contractionary fiscal policies according to its own more 





The case of Latvia was discussed in our previous paper and in the panel discussion. As noted 
previously,
  13 it is important because it is a case where the economy has been sacrificed – in fact, 
devastated – in order to preserve a fixed, overvalued exchange rate – as was the case in Argentina 
from 1998-2002.  
 
                                                 
11 See IMF 2009b, 24. 
12 CEPR 2009. 
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This policy, supported by both the IMF and the European Union, must be judged a failure on its 
face, without any necessity for counterfactual comparisons. The IMF projects Latvia’s real GDP to 
fall by 18 percent this year. The magnitude of this contraction is rare in modern economic history 
(outside of war), even in the worst financial disasters of the past century. A recent paper by Carmen 
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff looked at 14 severe financial crises.
14 The only declines greater than 
18 percent are Argentina (-22 percent), which occurred over the four years 1998-2002; and the US in 
the Great Depression, a 29 percent drop that also occurred over four years. An 18 percent decline in 
one year therefore indicates a major policy failure in dealing with the crisis, regardless of the 
mistakes that led up to it, and despite the fact that Latvia’s banking system did not (as of this 
writing) collapse. This indicates that even if the balance sheet effects of a currency devaluation – 
avoided in Latvia – were large, it would still have been better to deal with that problem rather than 
to undergo such a severe economic contraction, adopting pro-cyclical policies which have no doubt 
exacerbated it – in order to avoid devaluation. 
 
Standards of Comparison 
 
In its two published reviews and last week’s panel discussion, the Fund also defended its policies 
during the current downturn with comparisons to past crises, most notably the Asian economic 
crisis of 1997-1999 and others during the late nineties and early 2000s. The Fund points out that the 
huge interest rate spikes and exchange rate overshooting of past crises were avoided. This is true, 
and the IMF can note improvement in its policy recommendations on this account. However, this is 
much too low a bar. In the Asian crisis, the IMF was widely seen to have seriously exacerbated the 
downturn, and in fact the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office conceded that “[I]n Indonesia . . 
.the depth of the collapse makes it difficult to argue that things would have been worse without the 
IMF. . .”
15  The Fund’s role in Argentina’s crisis of 1998-2002 is also one of the worst episodes in its 
lending history; and in fact the IMF did not provide any net lending after the banking system and 
currency collapsed at the end of 2001.
16  
 
The Fund also presents a regression and scatter-plot diagram
17 in support of the argument that, 
although IMF program countries had much steeper declines in GDP than non-program countries, 
these differences were due to initial conditions and not to program effects. It is difficult to evaluate 
such results without more information about the analysis, including the data. However, we believe 
that IMF economists would agree that the econometric difficulties with this particular regression are 
enormous, and that it cannot be considered as any kind of conclusive evidence that the programs 
“worked.” Furthermore, this is also too low a bar, since even if the evidence from this regression 
were compelling, it would only show that the IMF programs did not have a net harmful effect. In 
fact, we would want and expect the IMF programs, and access to foreign exchange, to have a 
positive net impact on borrowing countries. 
 
The Fund also defends its initial, mostly 2008 agreements containing pro-cyclical policies on the 
grounds that their projections were over-optimistic. As discussed in our previous paper,
  18 by the 
time of IMF’s bad projections, there was plenty of available information and analysis to indicate that 
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the impact of the U.S. and high-income countries’ recession on low-and-middle-income countries 
would be severe. As noted above, the Fund now recognizes that asset bubbles should be taken into 
account when formulating economic policy.
19 But the problem of overly optimistic projections in 
conjunction with overly tight macroeconomic policy is one that has been noted before, not only by 
CEPR
20 but also by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office: 
 
The report also finds evidence of weaknesses in program design in certain areas. 
There is a tendency to adopt fiscal targets based on overoptimistic assumptions 
about the pace of economic recovery leading inevitably to fiscal 
underperformance and frequent revisions of targets. The optimism about growth 
recovery in the short term is itself often the consequence of overoptimistic 
assumptions about the pace of revival of private investment when a more 
realistic assessment in certain circumstances could have justified the adoption of 
a more relaxed fiscal stance on contracyclical grounds. (IEO 2003b, vii). 
 
We look forward to further discussion of IMF agreements and policy as the world economy 
recovers, and more loan agreements and reviews of current agreements are concluded. 
                                                 
19  See IMF Survey Magazine 2009. See also the latest WEO, which has several pages on real estate bubbles in various 
countries (IMF 2009c, 20-26).  
20 See Baker and Rosnick 2003 and Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007. Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 2009 • 7 
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